In February 2003, the SEC officially certified a fourth credit rating agency, Dominion Bond Rating Service ("DBRS"), for use in bond investment regulations. After DBRS certification, bond yields change in the direction implied by the firm's DBRS rating relative to its ratings from other certified rating agencies. A one notch better DBRS rating corresponds to a 39 basis point reduction in a firm's debt cost of capital. The impact on yields is driven by cases where the DBRS rating is better than other ratings and is larger among bonds rated near the investment-grade cutoff. These findings indicate that ratings-based regulations on bond investment affect a firm's cost of debt capital.
experienced a 39 basis point drop in bond yields compared to firms whose DBRS ratings were the same as the average of the other agencies. To avoid potential selection bias, we consider only bonds rated by DBRS prior to their obtaining NRSRO status. By holding the ratings fixed as of January of 2003, we rule out information-based explanations for the change in yields; since the ratings do not change over time, new information can not explain the change in yields. We also conduct two falsification tests, incorrectly assuming that a change in regulatory status occurred in February 2004 or February 2005 . Conducting the same experiments with these alternate dates does not generate any of the results we find for the actual event date. These tests indicate that the change in regulatory status of DBRS changed the impact of its ratings on a firm's bond yields.
While our tests rule out changes in information affecting yields, it may be that NRSRO status itself increases the value of DBRS ratings after February of 2003. Perhaps SEC certification enhances DBRS' reputation, thereby increasing the credibility of its ratings in the market, even if those ratings do not change. Prior to 2003, DBRS was not a well-established rating agency. Several rating agencies petitioned the SEC for NRSRO status, but only DBRS was granted the accreditation. This vetting out process may indicate that DBRS ratings are higher quality, and thus financial markets may consider ratings provided by DBRS as more informative after February 2003.
To rule out certification, we conduct two additional tests. First, we show that the effect of the change in DBRS's regulatory status affects yields only when they rate a firm better than the other agencies; when the DBRS rating is worse, the cost of capital does not increase.
Certification following promotion to NRSRO would imply a symmetric effect on yields. In contrast, the regulatory explanation implies that better ratings would affect bond yields because many of the regulations link investment constraints to the best of the NRSRO ratings or the second best. Second, the effect on yields is stronger around the investment-grade boundary, where regulations based on ratings are most prevalent and significant. The consequences for an issuer losing its investment grade rating can be substantial. For example, when S&P downgraded General Motors to speculative grade, their bonds fell 8%, and at least one reason provided was that the "downgrade has sent institutions running for the exits…many [of them] have rules that prohibit them from owning non-investment grade debt" (Forbes, 2005) . We find that firms with better DBRS ratings around the investment grade cutoff see a reduction in their debt cost of capital of approximately 54 basis points. While we have no direct data on bond holdings, we believe this decline occurs because more investors can hold these bonds, leading gradually to a decline in their yields. We conclude from this additional evidence that credit ratings affect a firm's cost of capital specifically due to regulations based on ratings.
Having established our main finding, we next test whether DBRS changes its ratings methods when it becomes an NRSRO. These tests are more descriptive in nature, and any interpretation of these results is more speculative. Yet we report these results to provide a more complete description of the impact of this event. After becoming an NRSRO, DBRS expands its market presence and rates more U.S. issuers. Moreover, before becoming an NRSRO, DBRS focused on the high-grade market. After, they increased their emphasis on speculative-grade firms and seem to have begun rating a wider array of firms, just as the incumbent NRSROs do.
We also find that DBRS ratings become more highly correlated with the ratings of the other NRSROs after February 2003. This ratings convergence occurs because the relationship between issue size and lagged yields and the DBRS rating shifts. Prior to becoming an NRSRO, large issues and bonds with a relatively high yield were more likely to be rated better by DBRS than the other agencies. This effect disappears after DBRS becomes an NRSRO. Also, when we control for the effect of size and yields, the ratings convergence result disappears. DBRS seems to have rated large and higher-yield firms more generously, perhaps trying to win market share. After February 2003, this incentive may have been dominated by the incentive to provide more credible ratings.
Our study extends recent papers testing how ratings affect bond yields. Kliger and Sarig (2000) use a similar quasi-natural experiment approach to test how information from ratings affects yields. They compare bond yields before and after Moody's added modifiers in April 1982, increasing the fineness of their ratings measure (e.g., an A-rated firm then became an A1, A2 or A3 rated firm). They find that the change in information content decreased yields of bonds rated at the high end of the scale relative to bonds rated at the low end. Our study complements theirs. Like Kliger and Sarig (2000) , we exploit a natural experiment, but our set-up varies the regulatory status of the rating agency holding information constant, exactly the reverse of their empirical design. Consistent with our study, Bongaerts, Cremers and Goetzmann (2008) find that Fitch ratings -the third NRSRO -matter mainly for regulatory reasons. While they are not able to exploit a natural experiment, they find that firms are more likely to have a Fitch rating when S&P and Moody's are on opposite sides of the investment grade margin, and that a positive Fitch rating only comes with lower yields for bonds near investment grade. Taken together, these studies indicate that ratings affect a firm's cost of capital for both information and regulatory reasons.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I we establish the main hypothesis of the paper and provide institutional details regarding rating regulations. In Section II we discuss the contribution of the paper relative to existing literature. In Section III we provide the empirical tests of the paper. In Section IV we conclude.
I. Hypothesis Development and Institutional Background

I. A. Ratings-Based Regulations and Debt Cost of Capital
The cost of debt capital for a firm is fundamentally determined by the risk free cost of capital and a spread due to estimated default risk. If the supply of debt capital from investors is infinitely elastic at the correct rate of interest and bonds are perfectly liquid, regulatory restrictions for certain investors on bond investment should not affect a firm's cost of capital.
However, if the supply of capital is not infinitely elastic, regulations which affect the cost to investors of investing in a particular bond class or restrictions placed on investors in certain bonds may affect a firm's cost of capital. For example, yields on bonds with higher regulatory costs will be higher to compete with bonds that have lower regulatory costs, ceteris 1 Our study also generally relates to previous literature which examines the information content of ratings, and whether ratings affect financing and investment decisions. Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) find statistically significant negative average excess bond and stock returns upon the announcement of bond rating downgrades. Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987) and West (1973) find that credit ratings are significant predictors of yield to maturity. Ederington and Goh (1998) show that credit rating downgrades result in negative equity returns. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Sufi (2009) find that having a rating increases a firm's leverage (and they conclude this is due to increased access to capital). Kisgen (2006 and 2009) finds that credit ratings affect firm capital structure decisions.
paribus. Restrictions on investment might also affect a bond's liquidity, which would affect a firm's cost of capital even if the supply curve was infinitely elastic. By affecting a firm's cost of capital, ratings-based regulations may materially affect a firm's financing and investment decisions.
Many investment rules and regulations are based on a bond's credit rating as provided by rating agencies.
2 Regulations based on credit ratings began as early as 1931, when banks were required to mark-to-market lower rated bonds. In 1936, the U.S. Treasury Department then issued a ruling that banks could not invest in securities that are "distinctly and predominantly speculative" according to a "designated standard" which must be "supported by not less than two rating manuals." Following this, banks went through a significant reorganization with the ultimate result being an increase in spreads between BBB rated and BB rated bonds. In 1989, Savings and Loans were prohibited from investing in junk bonds such that they could not hold any junk bonds by 1994. In 1993, the Basle Committee on Bank Supervision proposed in its market risk guidelines that internationally active commercial banks dealing in securities should hold extra capital against their non investment-grade bond inventories as well.
Insurance company investment is also affected by regulations based on ratings. In 1951, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) established the Securities Valuation Office (SVO) to assign risk ratings to bonds held in the investment portfolios of insurance companies. These risk ratings are largely determined using credit ratings, whereby the SVO assigns 6 quality ratings that correspond to the ratings of the major agencies. Firms that are rated A or above get a value of 1, firms that are BBB get a value of 2, BB get a 3, B a 4, any C level gets a 5, and any D rating gets a 6. The insurance company's capital requirements are determined by these ratings, thus higher capital requirements are imposed on insurers when their portfolios contain bonds with lower ratings, so the riskier securities are more expensive for insurance companies to own. At this time, the NAIC began equating the term "investment grade" to bonds with a Baa-rating or better. Investment grade bonds were therefore bonds with a rating of Baa or BBB or higher by Moody's or S&P's, respectively, and junk (or high-yield) bonds are those with a rating of Ba or BB or lower by Moody's or S&P's, respectively. In 1990, the NAIC further tightened guidelines for junk bond investment by life insurance companies.
Several additional institutions are affected by regulations based on ratings. SEC Rule 2a-7
states that money market mutual funds are required to limit investments in bonds rated less than A+, and commercial paper rated less than A1 (see Kisgen (2007) ). In 1975, the SEC adopted Rule 15c3-1 that set forth broker-dealer haircut requirements that were a function of the credit ratings of those securities. Through this rule, the SEC applied a net capital rule whereby credit ratings became the basis for determining the percentage reduction in the value ("haircut") of bonds owned by broker-dealers for the purpose of calculating their capital requirements. Many trustees use credit ratings to give guidelines to fund managers as well.
Pension funds also often place limits on the amount of a portfolio that can be invested in junk bonds, and in 1988 the Department of Labor instituted a regulation permitting pension fund investment in asset-backed securities only rated A or better. Investment grade bond mutual funds can only hold up to 5% of assets in non-investment grade bonds but must sell any security if it falls below a B rating. The Eurobond and Asset Backed Securities markets often require a certain rating for a firm to participate in that market. California state regulations prohibit California-incorporated insurance companies from investing in bonds rated below single-A. In this paper, we investigate whether these extensive rules and regulations affect a firm's cost of capital.
I. B. Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings Organizations (NRSROs)
The regulations discussed in the previous section are all based on credit ratings. Without further clarification for which rating agency's ratings could be used for these regulations, arbitrary firms could be established to provide specious "ratings" to circumvent the effects of these regulations. Recognizing this issue, in 1975 the SEC designated certain ratings agencies as "nationally recognized statistical rating organizations" (NRSROs), which indicated that they are qualified for use in regulations. The three existing rating agencies at the timeMoody's, S&P, and Fitch -were immediately "grandfathered" into the NRSRO category.
Consequently, only NRSRO ratings were valid for the determination of broker-dealers' capital requirements, and then bank and insurance company regulators adopted the NRSRO distinction, as did other financial regulators. The SEC then decided to use it again for money market mutual funds regulations. The SEC acknowledges, "Although we originated the use of the term NRSRO for a narrow purpose in our own regulations, ratings by NRSROs today are used widely as benchmarks in federal and state legislation, rules issued by other financial regulators, in the United States and abroad, and private financial contracts." (SEC, 2003) A rating agency must apply to the SEC to obtain NRSRO status. The NRSRO process has been criticized for a lack of transparency regarding the qualifications and process of obtaining NRSRO status and for perhaps inefficiently limiting the number of certified rating agencies, thereby stifling competition. Firms that were rejected for NRSRO status complained that the process was unfair and stifled competition. For example, Sean Egan of Egan-Jones stated, "We were somewhat surprised when DBRS was given the [NRSRO] designation. We had more than four times the recognition of them. We asked the SEC what exactly we needed to get this designation and they said they simply could not tell us and they are still studying it" and with recent regulations, has tried to minimize the impact of ratings. Our study speaks directly to one of the primary dimensions in which these regulations are material for a firm.
II. Credit Rating Literature and Relative Contribution
Significant literature examines the information content of ratings. Credit ratings might impact a firm's bond yields if they provide non-public information regarding a firm's probability of default. Rating agencies may receive significant sensitive information from firms that is not public, as firms may be reluctant to provide information publicly that would compromise their strategic programs, in particular with regard to competitors. Credit agencies might also specialize in the information gathering and evaluating process and thereby provide more reliable measures of the firm's creditworthiness. Regulation FD also excludes rating agencies, such that rating agencies continue to be allowed to receive non-public information.
The literature examining the information content of ratings is comprised of three main approaches: tests examining the relationship between the level of a firm's bond yield and ratings, tests examining the relationship between changes in yields and changes in ratings, and tests utilizing a natural experiment to identify the impact of ratings on bond yields. These studies typically do not make a distinction between regulatory versus information based explanations for the impact on yields, although most emphasize the information aspect. For example, Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992) find statistically significant negative average excess bond and stock returns upon the announcement of downgrades of straight debt.
Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987) and West (1973) find that credit ratings are significant predictors of yield to maturity beyond the information contained in publicly available financial variables and other factors that would predict spreads. Ederington and Goh (1998) show that credit rating downgrades result in negative equity returns and that equity analysts tend to revise earnings forecasts "sharply downward" following the downgrade. They further conclude that this action is a result of the "downgrade itself -not to earlier negative information or contemporaneous earnings numbers." 3 Becker and Milbourn (2009) (2006) use instrumental variables for the existence of a bond rating for identification. Sufi (2009) relies on firm fixed effects and control variables for identification. Our study differs from these studies by looking at the regulatory impact of different levels of ratings instead of the impact of having rating, we look at the impact on yields not leverage, and we rely on a natural experiment for identification. Our study also pinpoints the direct impact of regulations, whereas these other studies examine general supply of capital effects.
Finally, recent literature also focuses on the impact of ratings on corporate leverage. Kisgen (2006) finds that firm near a change in credit rating are more likely to undertake leverage reducing activity. Kisgen (2009) finds that after a firm is downgraded, a firm is more likely to reduce leverage, presumably to regain a previous rating target. These effects are shown to be stronger at the investment grade cutoff, and also stronger for firms which see downgrades in their commercial paper ratings, both of which are consistent with the significance of regulations. To the extent that we find that regulations based on ratings affect a firm's cost of capital, our paper provides justification for the corporate behavior documented in this previous work.
Our contribution lies fundamentally with our empirical design which allows us to identify specifically the regulatory impact of ratings. The change in regulatory status of DBRS should have no impact on the information content of DBRS ratings that were assigned prior to DBRS receiving that status. Even after DBRS received NRSRO status, the information impact of the change in status should be small. DBRS might be able to obtain better access to firms after receiving DBRS certification from the SEC, but it is unclear to what extent that would manifest. Our empirical tests also rely on the ratings prior to February 2003 to examine this affect, so the identification issues raised in Faulkender and Petersen (2006) , Sufi (2009) and Becker and Milbourn (2009) are mitigated. Our study is the first to document that regulations based on rating affect a firm's cost of capital. and S&P rate virtually all bonds, this sample is effectively the sample of firms rated by DBRS that we can identify in Bloomberg. The mean rating for bonds rated by DBRS increases after DBRS becomes an NRSRO, indicating that DBRS rates on average lower quality issuers after obtaining NRSRO status (a bond's rating is cardinalized for these tables, such that a AAA bond is coded with a value of 1, AA+ is 2, etc.). DBRS also appears to rate firms somewhat more favorably than the other rating agencies at all times, and that propensity increases slightly after NRSRO status. However, as we see below, this relationship may reflect some omitted characteristic of a bond which DBRS merely weights differently from the other agencies. Table 3 compares characteristics of firms rated by DBRS versus the sample of firms rated by S&P, using Compustat data. DBRS-rated firms are about three times larger than the average of firms rated by S&P. DBRS also rates a disproportionate number of mining and construction firms, which reflects its Canadian headquarters. No significant differences exist for leverage or the percentage of tangible assets for firms rated by DBRS compared to those rated by S&P. 
III. Empirical Results
III.A. Data and Summary Statistics
III.B. Main Tests
For each test, the dependent variable is the yield on a firm's bond for the indicated month NRSRO has no impact on the average rating the bond receives (and our explanatory variable equals 0). If DBRS differs from the other agencies, however, then a firm's average NRSRO rating will change as a result of the change in DBRS's regulatory status. Since we hold the 4 We report our results using the average of Moody's and S&P because almost all of our bonds are rated by both of the two major NRSROs. In contrast, only 5 of the 90 bonds are rated by Fitch. We have, however, also estimated equation (1) using the average across all three of the NRSRO when the Fitch rating is available and the results are very similar to those reported here. See Table 7 and the description below. obtains NRSRO status, we expect β 1 to be greater than 0, implying a better DBRS rating leads to lower yields and a worse rating leads to a higher yield. The null hypothesis is that the regulatory status of DBRS is not important for a firm's cost of capital, implying β 1 =0.
The results indicate that the difference in a bond's DBRS rating from the other agencies significantly affects its yield once DBRS obtains NRSRO status (Table 4) . By December 2003, yields change by 16 basis points per ratings-notch difference between DBRS and the other agencies. 6 Given the structure of the empirical design, it's difficult to explain this change in yield with anything other than this particular event. This change in yield however is not immediate. For example, three months after DBRS obtains NRSRO status, the yield change is only 5 basis points, and not statistically distinguishable from zero. The gradual increase in magnitude makes sense given the regulatory explanation for these results, and
given the relative illiquidity of the corporate bond market. Investors may not immediately adjust to the change in regulatory status of NRSRO, and therefore the full effect is 5 A change in the NRSRO rating stemming from an increase or decrease in default risk for a bond could also be correlated with yield changes. As a robustness test, we have also estimated equation (1) controlling for this effect by adding the change in the mean NRSRO rating between month T and January 2003. This variable does not enter the regression with a significant coefficient, and the effect of the pre-existing DBRS rating remains economically and statistically significant. See Table 7 and the description below.
6 Although we have clustered at the issuer level, we have also estimated the model using issuer-level averaged data with non-clustered, robust standard errors (so N=42 rather than 90). In this model the point estimate increases from 16 to 27 basis points at the 10-month horizon, with a T-statistic of 2.52 (from 2.17).
incorporated slowly as investors modify their portfolios. An information-based explanation would imply a more immediate impact on yields. 
III.C. Regulation, not certification
So far we have established that the change in regulatory status strengthened the market impact of the DBRS rating. Is that due to regulatory effects of ratings, or SEC certification of DBRS? Market participants might view ratings from DBRS as more credible signals of default risk because of a rigorous SEC vetting process. The remaining tests of this section are designed to clarify whether these results are indeed specific to ratings-based regulations.
In Table 5 , we examine whether the yield impact is larger when the DBRS rates a firm more favorably versus when it rates a firm worse. If the change in yield identified in Table 4 
This test is identical to the test of equation (1) except for the introduction of the dummy variables Better and Worse. Better equals one if the DBRS rates a firm better than the mean rating of the other agencies; Worse equals one if the DBRS rates a firm worse. If the DBRS rating is equal to the mean rating of the other agencies, the value of "DBRS-Mean Rating" is zero and thus the Better and Worse dummies are not live variables. The regulatory explanation implies that the coefficient on β 2 is greater than zero and that β 2 > β 3 . The certification explanation implies that both β 2 and β 3 are both greater than zero (and equal to each other).
The results of Table 5 indicate a significantly higher impact on yields from a DBRS rating that is better than the mean rating than if it is worse. A one notch better rating from DBRS implies a 39 basis point reduction in a firm's debt cost of capital by December 2003. The relative difference between a better DBRS rating versus a worse DBRS rating is 42 basis points (39-(-3)). The hypothesis that β 2 and β 3 are equal is rejected at the 1% level in all months six months or later than the event date. Furthermore, the impact on yields from a worse DBRS rating is insignificant in all months (in month seven it is 'significant' but in the wrong direction). The evidence in this table strongly support the notion that ratings-based regulations affect a firm's cost of capital.
In Table 6 , we examine whether the impact on yields from DBRS becoming an NRSRO is larger for firms rated near the investment-grade/speculative-grade cutoff. Many of the regulations outlined in Section I are concentrated or are more severe if a firm's rating is below investment grade. Therefore, a firm near the investment grade margin can benefit more from the change in DBRS's status than a firm that is very highly rated (A or above), or very poorly rated (B or worse). Having DBRS rate better than the other NRSROs accrues large benefits to firms near an upgrade to investment grade or to those near a downgrade to speculative grade.
To examine these firms, we create a dummy variable, "Near Investment Grade", which equals one if the firm is rated BBB or BB (Kisgen (2006) uses a similar measure)). If regulations are insignificant for a firm's cost of capital, we would expect to see no incremental difference for this group of firms. We interact the DBRS relative rating with a "Near Investment Grade" dummy variable to test if its effects are larger for these marginal firms. Table 6 shows that the effects are concentrated among firms near investment grade when DBRS rates better than the other agencies. The magnitude is both statistically and economically significant, with nearly a 55 basis point reduction in yields for firms with a better DBRS rating that are near the investment grade distinction (and a 16 basis point decline for better firms that are away from the investment grade margin). The large magnitude of the estimated effect presumably reflects the high spread between the investment grade and speculative grade markets during our sample, which averaged about 250 basis points in 2003 (BBB v. BB). Some caution should also be taken with the interpretation of these results, since the subsample of firms near the investment grade cutoff with a DBRS rating which is better than the average rating of other rating agencies is only 9 firms (and 15 bonds). The evidence nevertheless underscores the importance of regulations for a firm's cost of capital. Table 7 reports three robustness tests. Each column has one cross-sectional regression, inverting the presentation format of the ten month (December) row of Table 6 . Column 1 reports the benchmark regression for comparison, and the subsequent columns report the robustness tests. First, we redefine the relative rating variable using all three NRSROsMoody's, S&P and Fitch -to define the mean NRSRO rating (column 2). Second, we introduce four control variables: the initial (January 2003) mean NRSRO rating, the change in the mean NRSRO rating (December -January), the log of the size of the bond, and an indicator for Canadian issuers (column 3). Third, we change the dependent variable from the absolute yield change to the percentage change in yield, with and without the four new control variables (columns 4 & 5).
III.D. Robustness Tests
Our results remain similar across all robustness tests. Introducing the Fitch rating has very little impact because only 5 bonds are affected by this change; if anything the results get slightly stronger. Introducing the four control variables strengthens the effect of the DBRS rating for the firms near the investment-grade margin (slightly) and weakens the effect for the other bonds (again only slightly). Adding the initial level of the rating controls for the possibility that spreads within the corporate bond market changed; adding the change in the mean NRSRO rating controls for the possibility that some of the yields change due to changes in credit quality; adding the log of issue size controls for the possibility that larger issues experienced a change in yields compared to smaller issues; and adding the Canadian indicator controls for the possibility that Canadian firms experienced yield changes relative to American issuers. In fact, we do find significance on both the initial rating and the Canadian indicator (R 2 rises to about 50%), but adding these controls has very little effect on our main result.
III.E. Does DBRS change it ratings methods?
In Table 8 we test whether DBRS changes the way it rates bonds. For these tests, we use the sample of bonds rated by DBRS prior to becoming an NRSRO (columns 1-3), and we then expand the sample to include all DBRS-rated bonds before and after February 2003 (columns 4-6). By including all bonds, we lose the clean identification of the tests of the previous section. However, including them allows us to examine the behavior of DBRS before and after they receive NRSRO status. While causality is hard to sort out in these tests, we report them to paint a more complete picture of this event.
The dependent variable for the tests in Table 8 equals the DBRS rating in a particular bondmonth. We order the ratings from 1 (AAA) to 2 (AA+) all the way up to 20 (CC). We report both fixed effects OLS regressions (columns 1 and 4), and, since there are no natural units for credit ratings, ordered Logits. The independent variables are bond or issuer characteristics, measured one month prior to the month for the DBRS rating. These variables include the mean rating issued by S&P and Moody's (measured on the same numerical scale), the log of the issue size, the yield of the issue, an indicator for whether the bond was issued by a Canadian firm, an indicator for bonds near the investment grade cutoff, and an indicator for whether the time period was after DBRS receives NRSRO status. The yield of the issue and the rating of the issue are of course correlated; moreover, it is difficult to sort out the causality between yields and ratings because ratings changes both lead and lag yield changes. Hence we report results with and without the yield.
The first and fourth columns of Table 8 Next, we drop the bond fixed effects and replace them with bond characteristics to help identify why DBRS diverges from the other agencies. We report ordered Logits, which are estimable (and preferred to OLS) in the absence of the fixed effects. DBRS tends to provide a more favorable rating to large issues prior to gaining NRSRO status, but this preference falls in the post-NRSRO period. In the sample with all bonds, the sum of the direct and interaction terms is not statistically significant, suggesting that there is no impact of issue size after DBRS becomes an NRSRO. (Since the model conditions on the other NRSRO ratings, the result means that DBRS does not place greater weight on size than the other agencies.) DBRS also seems to provide Canadian issuers more favorable ratings in both periods. We find no evidence that DBRS rates firms near the investment grade cutoff more favorably, either before or after becoming an NRSRO. Having shown that DBRS rates more firms near the investment grade cutoff in the post period, one might expect that they would also systematically provide them with better ratings. This does not appear to be the case. We conclude that although there is more demand for DBRS ratings from firms near the investment grade cutoff, DBRS maintains its objectivity when rating them.
In columns 3 and 6, we add the bond yield to the models. Prior to February 2003, firms with higher bond yields receive better ratings from DBRS, controlling for the firm's rating from the other agencies. This result could reflect demand from firms who believe their bond yields do not reflect fundamentals, and who therefore seek another rating. Or, DBRS may market their services to firms whose ratings appear too conservative. Regardless, it suggests a contrarian style prior to NRSRO status. In the post NRSRO period, this relationship disappears completely. The coefficient on the yield interacted with the post period (0.69) negates the pre NRSRO effect (-0.75), and the sum of these effects is not significant in either sample.
IV. Conclusions
We have shown that regulations constraining bond investment affect yields and thus firms' cost of capital. Our strategy exploits a quasi-natural experiment: in February 2003, the SEC deemed DBRS a 'Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization'. Ratings granted by such NRSROs are used to determine capital requirements for holders of bonds such as insurance companies, banks and broker-dealers. Moreover, some investors will not hold bonds unless they are rated investment grade by one or more of the NRSROs. We find that bond yields fall for firms that DBRS rates more favorably than the other NRSROs after the SEC's decision. The decline shows up asymmetrically. There is no increase in yields for bonds that DBRS rates relatively unfavorably. Moreover, the effects are larger around the investment-grade cutoff, where the effects of regulatory constraints are most binding. Hence,
we conclude that bond regulations affect yields. The result suggests that simple tradeoff theories, where firms balance financial distress costs against tax benefits, are too simple. Our results imply, for example, that a firm losing its investment grade would suffer a larger increase in its cost of capital than would be expected solely from the implied increase in probability of distress.
We also provide some descriptive evidence about DBRS' ratings methods before and after becoming an NRSRO. These results are harder to interpret causally, particularly correlations between ratings and yields. Nevertheless, the data suggest that DBRS rates bonds more like the other major agencies after becoming an NRSRO. In 2006 Congress passed legislation improving the transparency and lowering the cost of becoming an NRSRO. Five new agencies have recently become NRSROs, raising the total number to nine from three less than ten years ago. This change in structure may radically alter the incentive of these agencies, especially because, as we have shown, ratings granted by them can change firms' cost of capital even absent changes in risk. This table reports regressions of the DBRS rating on the average rating by Moody's and S&P, along with issue characteristics. Each rating is converted into a number (e.g. AAA=1, AA+=2, etc), so an increase in the dependent variable means DBRS rates the firm worse. All of the regressors are measured as of the preceding month. We report each model with fixed-effects OLS and also using an ordered logit (w/o the bond-level fixed effects). Also, we report the model for all of our data and for the subset of bonds rated by DBRS both before and after the change in their status. T-statistics are reported in parentheses based on residuals clustered by firm (since some firms issue more than one bond).
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